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The Scottish independence referendum need not include the
rest of the UK, even though they are affected
Scotland’s decision in the upcoming independence referendum will have serious  implications for the whole
UK. It has been argued that all UK citizens outside Scotland should therefore be entitled to vote on Scottish
independence, in line with the ‘all affected interests’ principle of democratic theory. Ben Saunders asks
whether we should apply this principle to the referendum, concluding that it is not necessary for the result to be
considered legitimate.
As previously discussed on Democratic Audit , the coming ref erendum on Scottish independence raises a
number of  important constitutional issues. However, it also raises some more f undamental moral
questions. Point f our of  the Scottish Government’s policy memorandum states that the ref erendum should
“be (and … be seen to be) a fair, open and truly democratic process”, but this invites discussion about what
it is f or a decision to be taken democratically.
The term ‘democracy’ derives, etymologically, f rom the Greek demokratia, which translates as something like
people (demos) power (kratos). This isn’t much help without some account of  what people-power means
though; f or instance, whether democracy requires that the people themselves exercise power directly or
whether it is consistent with power being delegated to their elected representatives. One particular puzzle
that has exercised theorists of  democracy, since at least the 1970s, is just who the ‘people’ in question are
– what’s come to be known as the ‘boundary problem’.
Of ten it is taken f or granted that ‘the people’ ref ers either to the cit izens of  a given state or residents of  a
given territory (or perhaps those who ‘live and work’ there), though these conditions can come apart when
we consider expatriate workers and the like. Either understanding of  ‘the people’ has struck many
commentators as inadequate though, when it allows the members of  one ‘people’ to take decisions with
prof ound ef f ects upon outsiders.
One popular answer to this puzzle has been that everyone who is af f ected by a decision should be granted
a say in it. In other words, ‘the people’ consists of  everyone with something at stake in a decision. This is
known as the all af f ected principle. It has f ound f avour because of  its inclusivity; democracy has always
stood f or the rule of  the many, rather than the f ew (as in monarchy or aristocracy). This inclusivity is of ten
justif ied on the grounds that the people should be able to protect their own interests, rather than relying on
the good will of  others. It seems natural, then, to conclude that all those with interests at stake should be
entit led to participate, in order to def end those interests.
If  democratic principles require that everyone who is af f ected by a decision is able to participate in it, then
nation-state decision-making is of ten undemocratic, except where the decision af f ects only members of
that nation or state. Advocates of  the all af f ected principle of ten embrace this conclusion, arguing that the
Brit ish have no right to decide to build coal- f ired power stations that pollute Scandinavia. Some, like Bob
Goodin, go so f ar as to propose that the best way to satisf y democratic principles is to enf ranchise
everyone on all decisions.
What relevance does this have to Scottish independence? Well, if  everyone af f ected must be entit led to
participate in order to conf er democratic legit imacy on a decision, then it seems that a decision made only
by the Scots cannot be democratic. There have been popular calls to allow the English (and presumably
those in the rest of  the UK) to vote on Scottish independence (see here and the petit ions here, here, and
here). Even this, however, would not go f ar enough.
While the EU membership of  an independent Scotland is currently unclear, what does seem clear is that
Scottish independence would have knock-on ef f ects f or the rest of  the EU. In particular, if  Scotland
successf ully secedes f rom the UK then this may inspire other separatist movements, such as the Catalans.
But, if  all these groups are af f ected by the decision, then perhaps they too should be included in the
ref erendum, if  it  is to be truly democratic.
While the all af f ected principle does support claims that non-Scots in the rest of  the UK should have a say
over Scottish independence, it also requires that a say be granted to many outside the UK too. Thus, this
principle cannot support the posit ion that all and only those in the UK should decide on the f uture of  the
UK. It is not, theref ore, as helpf ul to those calling f or an English/rest of  UK say as might be supposed.
All of  this, however, presupposes that the all af f ected principle does accurately capture the requirements
of  democracy: that there is something undemocratic about any group making a decision that af f ects
outsiders without their input. However, this principle seems less sound than its adherents believe. In f act, I
think we have good reasons to reject the all af f ected principle as a requirement of  legit imacy. (That is,
either the all af f ected principle does not tell us what democracy requires or it tells us what democracy
requires but democracy can justif iably be overridden in pursuits of  other values, like people’s rights. The
relation between democracy and substantive rights is also a matter of  considerable academic debate.)
Consider a contractual relationship. Both parties must agree to the contract in order f or it to be binding.
Usually, however, either party can unilaterally choose to terminate the contract in line with the terms set out
in it. Both parties must consent to a marriage, but only one need f ile f or divorce in order to signal that that
mutual consent is no longer ongoing. It even takes two to establish Facebook f riendship (one clicks ‘add
f riend’ and the other accepts the request), but either one can later remove the f riendship.
We might say that all these examples illustrate the principle that it takes two to tango, but only one to stop.
If  one party no longer consents to the relationship in question, then they have the power to dissolve it
unilaterally. Note that this is so even though their doing so will invariably af f ect the other party. Admittedly, it
may be that they have this right only because granted it originally by the other party – that is, because it
was part of  the contract that they entered in to – but this doesn’t change the point.
I’ve not argued that the Scottish people in f act have a right to terminate their relationship with the rest of
the UK. If  any group could secede f rom a larger unit, then perhaps northern England would also wish to
secede; indeed we might f ace a chain of  smaller and smaller breakaway units. But if the Scots have such a
right, then they’re entit led to exercise it, without needing to consult or enf ranchise the English or anyone
else. That the English are af f ected by the exercise of  such a right does not mean that they must be entit led
to vote in the ref erendum.
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